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RECENT CASES
ants in either a tort or contract action because of a single
wrongdoing.
Pecuniary harm is usually the element present in contract
actions. Therefore it is much disputed whether recovery
should be allowed where damages resulted only from mental
anguish caused by the breach of contract.7 The weight of
authority' asserts damages will be awarded for mental an-
guish which the promisor had reason to anticipate and which
was caused by the wanton or reckless breach of contract.
North Dakota has held,' as does the instant case, that no
damages can be recovered for a shock or outrage to the feel-
ings caused by a breach of contract. Compensation for men-
tal disturbance may be had only in the presence of physical
injury."
A North Dakota statute provides that damages must be the
amount that will compensate the injured party.1 Moreover,
they must be clearly ascertainable or there can be no recov-
ery.'
North Dakota, then, is in alignment with the minority rule
espousing refusal of recovery for mental anguish resulting
from a breach of contract. Perhaps North Dakota should
change its position and allow recovery for mental anguish
caused by factors other than physical injuries. This would
certainly be more just to many plaintiffs who are denied re-
covery under North Dakota law today.
C. LAUREL BIRDSALL
EVIDENCE-DISCOVERY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT--GOVERN-
MENTAL PRIVILEGE TO WITHHOLD THE CONTENTS OF OFFICIAL
DoCUMENTS.-Plaintiff, a member of the Air Force, was the
sole survivor of an airplane crash. He brought an action
against the company which manufactured the aircraft to re-
cover for his injuries. The Secretary of the Air Force was re-
quested by plaintiff's counsel to release a copy of the Air-
7. Compare O'Meallie v. Moreau, 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906) (Re-
covery); and Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916) (Recovery);
with Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac, 151 (1913) (No recovery);
and Adams v. Brosius, 69 Ore. 513, 139 Pac. 729 (1914) (No recovery).
8. Westesen v. 0lathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217. 240 Pac. 689 (1925); Mc-
Connell v. United States Express Co., 179 Mich. 522, 146 N.W. 428 (1914);
Burrus v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., 38 Nev. 156, 145 Pac. 926 (1915).
9." Russell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 3 Dak. 315, 19 N.W. 408
(1884) (Recovery, however, may be had for breach of a marriage con-
tract).
10. Id. at 409.
11. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-09 (1961).
12. Ibid.
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craft Accident Investigation Report, for it contained informa-
tion pertinent to the case. The Secretary refused the request,
whereupon the plaintiff caused a subpoena duces tecum to be
issued for the purpose of obtaining the document. A motion
to quash the subpoena was filed by the Secretary who assert-
ed that under Air Force Regulations' the material sought by
the subpoena was privileged. The United States District
Court, District of Columbia denied the motion. While the
court declined to pass upon the question of privilege, it held
that the needs of the plaintiff to obtain the document out-
weighed the considerations assigned by the Secretary. In re
Zuckert, 28 F.R.D. 29 (1961).
With current increases in the volume and scope of govern-
mental activity, many occasions arise wherein the government
may be in possession of documents, reports, or other data,
necessary to the cause of the private litigant. Private parties,
however, seeking to subpoena records held by government
agencies are frequently met by a claim that the agency is
privileged not to disclose documents in its possession.
The government's privilege against revealing state secrets
of a military' or diplomatic' nature is well established in the
law of evidence. In these cases the interest of the individual
litigant must bow to the interest of governmental security.
The government has also repeatedly claimed that Section 22
of Title 5 of the United States Code' gives a general statutory
immunity to the documents of a governmental agency, when-
ever it has promulgated regulations prohibiting disclosure.
The validity of regulations promulgated under this statute to
restrict use of governmental records was established in the
1. Air Force Regulation 62-14, § 49 (1960). "In many instances the oc-
curence of an accident requires an investigation for purposes other than
accident prevention. It is Air Force policy that the reports listed in this
paragraph will be used only to determine all factors related to aircraft
accidents. . . . The reports just mentioned . . . are privileged documents."
2. F_ g. Mitchell v. Roma, 22 F.R.D. 217 (E.D. Pa. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959); Jackson v. Allen Industries, Inc., 250
F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 972 (1958)-.
3. United States v. Haugen, 58 t. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wash. 1944) "the
right of the Army to disclose confidential information, the secrecy of
which it deems necessary to national defense, is indisputable." see Vierick
v. United States,,130 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1942); In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62
(3d Cir. 1910); see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Firth
3terling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
4. Kessler v. Best, 121 Fed. 439 (1903).
5. Rev. Stat. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). "The head
of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers
and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the cus-
tody, use and preservation of the records, papers and property appertain-
Ing to it. This section does not authorize withholding information from
the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." (Amend-
ment italicized.)
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leading case of Boske v. Comingore.' These regulations have
the force of law,' and have been held to justify a subordinate's
refusal to disclose documents declared confidential under de-
partmental classifications, even under the threat of contempt
citation The application of the statute and the corresponding
regulations have reached a maze of government agencies
Although over the years the government has repeatedly as-
serted that the department head alone has the power to deter-
mine whether particular documents shall be deemed privi-
leged,"0 the Supreme Court has been reluctant to grant such
sweeping control.1 Unless considerations of national security
appear to be involved, - the courts have taken the position that
the matter of privileged nature of documents sought should
be determined by the courts." The Government, as plaintiff in
such an action, is subject to a motion for dismissal upon its
failure to produce the document for the court to determine its
privileged nature." The practical problem still remains, how-
ever, as to whether a department or agency head could be held
in contempt should he fail to abide by a court order to divulge
requested information." As far as it can be ascertained, no
6. 177 U.S. 211 (1894); see also Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1935); Wallig v. Comet Carriers, 3 P.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Stengall v.
Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910).
7. Ex parte Sackett, 174 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935); see also Caha v.
United States, 152 U.S. 211 (1894).
8. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); In re Appeal of Security Exchange Commis-
sion and Timbers, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955); Jackson v. Allen Industries,
Inc., 250 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 972 (1958).
9. In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446 (W.D. Ark. 1903) (alcohol tax in-
formation); O'Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstad, 10 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1949)
(income tax returns); United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 51 F. Supp.
974 (D.N.J. 1943) (informer's qui tam action); Federal Life Insurance v.
Holod, 30 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Pa. 1945) (wage and hour information); Ja-
coby v. Delfiner, 183 Misc. 280, 51 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct 1944) (immi-
gration and naturalization information); Harwood v. McMurty, 22 F. Supp.
572 (W.D. Ky. 1938) (allegedly libellous information furnished to a superior
by an internal revenue agent).
10. See 25 Ops. Att'y Gen. 326 (Moody, 1905); 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 45
(Jackson, 1941).
11. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 "Judicial control over
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may automatic-
ally require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privil-
ege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court,
from the compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which,
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged."
12. Ibid. also Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Haw. 1947).
13. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719
(W.D. La. 1949), aftfd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); Tobin v. Gibe, 13 F.R.D. 16 (D.
Del. 1952); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Haw. 1947);
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
14. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719
(W.D. La. .949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
15. 4 MOORE, FEDEIRAL, PRACTICE, 26.25, p. 1167 (2d ed. 1950). i'...It
would not be seemly for a federal court to hold a cabinet officer or a head
of a department in contempt, and certainly not for a state court to do so,
and it is doubtful whether the court would have the power to take such
action." but see the concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J. in United
States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) at p. 473, "To hold now,
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executive head has ever been cited for contempt in such cir-
cumstances.'
Although the 1958 Congressional amendment to the "house-
keeping" statute" apparently intended to terminate the agen-
cies' power to withhold information from the public under
the authority of the statute," this aim has not yet reached
fulfillment. At least one federal case9 since the amendment
allowed a subordinate to withhold documents under an agency
regulation. Thus the rule of Boske v. Comingore appears to
continue untrammeled.
MIKLOS L. LONKAI
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-RULE 41(b)-DISMISSAL OF A
CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE--The plaintiff had gained an earlier
reversal from an order of a judgment on the pleadings,' in an
action arising out of an automobile-train collision. The case
was remanded after several interrogatories and two continu-
ances were granted, one for each party. These facts alone
made this the oldest civil case on the court's calendar. A pre-
trial conference was then set. The plaintiff's counsel attempt-
ed to obtain a rescheduling because he was out of town on a
matter before the state supreme court. Nevertheless, the
court exercised its inherent power of dismissal. The court felt
that the plaintiff's excuse. was not legitimate. On appeal the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held, one
justice dissenting, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the case. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
291 F.2d 542 (1961).
A dismissal under rule 41(b), unless otherwise specified,
that the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his subordinates, though
within the court's jurisdiction, to produce documents and to hold later
that the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be procedurally
reached would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice that ought to
make Bentham's skeleton rattle."
16. But see in Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir 1951) The
Secretary of Commerce, a party defendant, was held in contempt for refus-
ing to obey a court order directing him to endorse and deliver corporate
stock certificates held by him to certain parties adjudged to be the right-
ful owners. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment and
ordered the proceedings dismissed as moot.
17. Note 5 supra.
18. See Hearings on Availability of Information from Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies Before a Sub-committee of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1955): H.R. Rep.
1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 6551 (1958).
19. Hubbard v. Southern Railway Company, 179 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Ga.
1959).
1. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 237 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1956). ert. denied, 352
U.S. 1003 (1957).
